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The attempt in the 1960s and 1970s to disperse civil service jobs 
from London to the English- regions, Scotland and Wales appears in ret-
rospect as one of the most interesting problems of policy implementa-
tion in Britain during these years. The experience shows how lack of 
clarity about the objectives of a programme can lead to a kind of 
'policy capture' - the effective replacement of original goals rest-
ing on 'rational' analysis, without partisan or sectional loading, by 
other goals politically more salient but incapable of sustaining the 
same kind of consensual justification. In this case, confusion be-
tween two sets of goals was for a time suppressed by the momentum of 
the policy, but eventually could not be overcome and resulted in the 
programme's virtual liquidation in 1979. The conflict between the 
goals - which may be characterised as promotion of the interests of 
the civil service and promotion of the interests of the peripheral 
regions - was most acute in Scotland; it was no coincidence that the 
political stakes on the programme were highest there also, and it is 
the main focus of this analysis. 
The problem of policy implementation which civil service disper-
sal displayed has become an important area for academic analysis be-
cause of the manifest failure of many public policies in recent years 
to deliver on their objectives. Work like that led by Wildavsky in 
Oakland has emphasised how confusion over goals is a frequent condi-
tion of policy initiatives, and that weaknesses in policy articulation 
and means-ends specification lie behind implementation problems. {l) 
Such problems are most prevalent in multi-agency programmes such as 
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urban renewal, and in Scotland have been evident in the Glasgow East 
End Renewal project. The danger is that objectives come to be obscured 
as implementors, in their preoccupation with the complexity of acti-
vity, lose sight of the objectives they are supposed to be seeking. 
This substitution of goals promoted by the pressures of the im-
plementation process for the original legitimate goals has been descri-
bed by Amitai Etzioni as 'goal displacement•. ( 2 ) Such a concept im-
plies implementation failure through an excessively complicated net-
work of procedural stages and organisational actors. Its weakness, 
perhaps, is that it confuses lack of clarity in goals with lack of 
resilience in the execution process. If those executing a policy are 
able to mobilise the authority necessary to push it through, goal 
displacement maybe ridden out even in the face of considerable depar-
ture from original goals. An alternative concept, more applicable to 
situations where execution is tighter and more directive - still often 
the case in British central government - is that of goal discrepancy, 
where a policy comes to be sustained by more than one set of goals, 
which overlap and share some potency but are fundamentally irreconcil-
able. Although implementation may proceed successfully for a time, the 
tensions between discrepant goals eventually intrude, especially at 
times of policy stress, like changes of government or public expendi-
ture restraint. This is what happened in civil service dispersal. 
Dispersal is also significant in terms of regional economic poli-
cy, as it is one of the few explicit attempts to shift jobs from one 
location to another. Policies designed to stimulate employment through 
relatively superior economic inducements are frequent, but an actual 
shift of jobs, with occupants moving with them, is an unusually strong 
policy in an age of deference to existing employment positions. The 
contention that workers in declining areas should be expected to move 
to more prosperous areas, commonplace in the 1930s, has been overtaken 
by the presumption that new employment opportunities should be brought 
to them - but this has seldom been taken to imply the relocation of 
existing jobs. The fact that it happened in this case can only be ex-
plained in the light of the initial goals of the programme - that it 
offered a positive-sum benefit to the civil service itself, by both 
saving money and enhancing job-satisfaction, paralleling the common 
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justification for office relocation in the private sector. Once this 
was obscured by the later set of goals - closely aligned with the ge-
neral perception of regional policy as zero-sum game, penalising some 
areas and groups of staff in order to favour others - the policy be-
came increasingly divorced from the norms of good employment practice. 
An additional theoretical perspective, from organisation theory, 
is the wish of any organisation to keep control of the most intimate 
parts of its job environment by domesticating matters like work prac-
tices and location. Public bureaucracies, geared to respond to rapid 
changes in policy direction and operating in an atmosphere of politic-
al uncertainty, are especially concerned to protect the circumstances 
and practices through which the job is performed from 'arbitrary' 
political interference. In Britain, greater self-confidence by civil 
service trade unions, boosted by their experience in using selective 
industrial action, has intensified this tendency in the 1970s. At the 
individual level, the possibility of involuntary transfer to any part 
of the country reduces the attractions of a civil service job. At the 
collective level, this leads to sensitivity to the unwelcome shifting 
of jobs and to the possibility of using collective pressure to thwart 
it. Once any major domestic change like dispersal ceases to be positive-
sum for an organisation's own interests, implementation problems are 
unavoidable. 
Civil service dispersal has consisted of a number of distinct and 
overlapping programmes, which are summarised in Table 1 and itemised 
for Scotland. One point is fundamental. Although the absolute numbers 
involved are substantial - around 80,000 posts relocated since 1945 -
they are small in the context of the aggregate size of the civil ser-
vice, let alone public employment as a whole: about 10 per cent of 
the former and 1 per cent of the latter in Great Britain, and 15 per 
cent and 1~ per cent in Scotland, including posts announced but not 
yet delivered. ( 3 ) The overriding constraint has been that any image 
of the civil service as an army of Whitehall bureaucrats is a myth. 
Only a quarter of the civil service works in London, and many of 
these are in direct client-serving offices (like social security) 
which must be locally-based. These are paralleled by similar local 
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English regional offices and even move to the Scottish and Welsh 
Offices. This means that the pool of headquarters jobs in London avail-
able for dispersal is small in relation to the total size of the civil 
service - less than 15 per cent - and has become smaller as the dis-
persal policy progressed. An associated problem is that some regions 
claiming dispersal, and Scotland in particular, have never had a fully 
convincing case that they are severely deprived of civil service jobs. 
The existence of the Scottish Office in Edinburgh since 1939 with its 
full range of policy responsibilities brought Scotland to not far short 
of a fair share on a population basis. (
4
) The more salient question 
has been the distribution of jobs within Scotland and especially their 
concentration in Edinburgh, as a result of which it is difficult to 
make a Scottish case vis-a-vis the rest of the United Kingdom • 
The initial, ad hoc, phase of the dispersal programme, from 
1945 to 1963, was sustained by the civil service's own interests. It 
stemmed from wartime experience, when about 50,000 officials were 
temporarily evacuated from London. Some never came back. Between 1945 
and 1963 25,000 jobs were moved out of London in search of cheaper 
office accommodation and clerical labour. The largest component was 
the move of 11,000 social security clerical jobs to Blackpool and 
Newcastle, but most of the remainder went to agreeable English country 
towns, establishing presences - like the defence departments• 'Lon-
don-Bath axis' - that constrained future moves. Scotland did badly, 
with fewer than 1,000 posts, mainly in the Inland Revenue. Unable to 
claim jobs in departments dealing only with England, and distant from 
London, Scotland was bound to lose in such 'spontaneous' dispersal. 
The introduction of the second set of goals - those of dispersal 
as a concerted act of regional policy - came as part of the Conserva-
tive Government's concern with unemployment in some regions in 1962/ 
63 - symbolised by Lord Hailsham's 'cloth cap' visits to the North 
East of England and the new interest in economic planning in Central 
Scotland. In a wider context, it represented a response to Conserva-
tive Party weakness in peripheral areas of Britain, technocratic con-
cern with the disequilibrium of economic activity in favour of London, 
and faith in planning correctives. Intrinsic civil service concerns 
like the position of staff- were overtaken by the bolder economic 
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themes. In 1962 the Government asked Sir Gilbert Flemming to prepare 
a report on the potential for further dispersal. His (unpublished) 
report recommended the dispersal of 24,000 posts- 7,500 by one major 
move, the Post Office Savings Bank, 6,000 in smaller moves, 4,500 to 
the London suburbs and 7,000 from existing plans. {5 ) Significantly, 
the Ministry of Defence, the largest UK department, was not included 
in the review because of its concurrent reorganisation. 
These jobs were available for regional purposes - 'we shall give 
special consideration in respect of these moves to the possibilities 
of moving to areas of relatively high unemployment•. {6 ) But the policy
was still London-orientated. The prime purpose was to 'check the 
growth of office employment in the central London area, in the inter-
ests both of regional policy and the health and welfare of those who 
live and work in the London area•.{ 7 ) Only the Savings Bank and 1,000 
posts from the smaller moves were considered suitable to be moved 
well away from London. The policy was vulnerable to changes in plann-
ing parameters and the perception of the need to correct an overheating
of London's office economy. 
The allocation of the Post Office Savings Bank to Glasgow in 
March 1964 was an undoubted coup for Scotland, but as a harbinger of 
future dispersal possibilities it was misleading. Its allocation was 
described tersely as being 'in the national interest•; in fact,as a 
self-contained large clerical factory capable of long-distance disper-
sal, there were political advantages for the Government in an election 
year of swallowing the inevitable staff protests and going for the lo-
cation where relief for unemployment and kudos for the Conservative 
Party would be maximised. In this calculation, Scotland edged out the 
North East. Neither the availability of such a convenient package of 
jobs nor the conjunction of political circumsta~ces is likely for 
s~otland in the future. 
The rhetoric of regional policy, and the use of dispersal as an 
instrument of it, continued under the 1964 Labour Government. The 
Flemming moves went ahead, and in 1965 it was decided that civil ser-
vice jobs created by new policy tasks should as far as possible be 
located in the regions - a recognition of the political advantages of 
avoiding the movement of existing job-holders, but one which qualified 
90 
the concept of dispersal and tended to tie the policy to the degree 
of expansion in the civil service. Also significant was the introduc-
tion of Office Development Permits in London in 1965, which increased 
the scarcity value of office space in London and so pushed up rents, 
to the competitive advantage of provincial locations. This maintained 
the rational initial goal of dispersal policy. 
The developing conception of the policy,as the delivery of econo-
mic relief through one-off political gestures was tailor-made for 
haggling about the destination of each project, usually around the 
Cabinet table. Here, arguments about relative need were countered by 
complex political calculations. In this, Wales was best placed be-
cause it was both a nation- with its own cabinet minister demanding 
its due of UK civil service jobs - and a region,able to match most 
parts of England on criteria like accessibility to London and relative 
acceptability to staff opinion. The English regions could not match 
Wales on channels of advocacy, and Scotland could not meet the 'objec-
tive' criteria, having to rely on a cruder pork-barrel case. This 
interplay comes through well in Richard Crossman's account of the 
Cabinet meeting on 18 April 1967 which decided to send the Royal Mint 
and its 1,000 jobs from London to Wales: 
• .••• the choice has narrowed to Llantrisant at the 
end of the Rhondda Valley, Washington New Town in 
the North East, and Cumbernauld near Glasgow. Not 
unnaturally the Cabinet Committee was completely 
split. The Chancellor and the Treasury officials 
said there was no doubt the people in the Mint 
themselves would prefer South Wales if they had to 
move at all. But the Chancellor's credibility was 
somewhat undermined by the fact that he represents a 
Cardiff constituency. Michael Stewart for the DEA 
said that on the whole in terms of the dispersal 
policy the strongest case was for the North East 
and Willie Ross, as Secretary of State for Scotland, 
insisted on Cumbernauld •••••• Willie Ross spoke with 
great bitterness and sounded like a man who knew he 
was defeated before the debate began. After an hour 
and a half the PM counted heads and finally said that 
Wales had it•.{8) 
Through such arguments, Wales also gained under the Labour Gov-
ernment the only other tlerical factory' able to match the Savings 
Bank in numbers - the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre, planned to 
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provide 6,500 jobs taken over from local authorities and sent to 
Swansea, and other useful contingents like the 1,000-job Business 
Statistics Office for Newport. Scotland, now benefitting from the 
Savings Bank, did less well: most of its new jobs were at the Inland
Revenue Centre 1 at East Kilbride, whose tasks came chiefly from other
local offices in Scotland. Within England, 80 per cent of the jobs 
went to the North West, the North East and the South East, and very 
few to the Midlands, the South West or East Anglia. This reflects 
the smaller number -of significant dispersals and the consequent di-
fficulty of securing an even distribution; the importance of estab-
lishing an identity as 'recipient region• (which most parts of Eng-
land failed to do); and the residual role of the South East as a 
'sort• way of moving jobs out of London. The role of political and 
operational variables in these decisions is difficult to distinguish. 
By 1970 dispersal policy was not yet impeded by its discrepant 
goals and still enjoying consensual political support; but it called 
for fresh analysis and justification. The new Conservative Govern-
ment asked a retires civil servant, Sir Henry Hardman, to prepare a 
one-man report on the possibilities of further dispersal, which was 
published in 1973. The report gained considerably in trenchancy from 
not being a committee product. Hardman looked at 86,000 civil service 
jobs in London (a further 11,000 not being under review), andre-
commended 31,000 as being suitable for dispersal because of an accept-
able tradeoff between 'communications loss• to the dispersing depart-
ment (the loss of proximity between staff, causing necessary meetings 
either to be abandoned or have staff travel to them) and 'resource 
gain• (in the form of increased employment and cheaper office accommo-
dation). (
9
) A computer model was used to calibrate the tradeoff for 
each move and the effect of more or less distant locations. A target 
tradeoff involving an acceptable ratio of gain to damage 'emerged' in 
discussions with departments and the recommendations were geared to 
it; but nowhere in the report is there an explicit justification of 
why, on the continuum of cost and benefit, 31,000 was the right num-
ber of jobs to disperse. 
In the distribution of recommended locations, Scotland could not 
avoid doing badly from the objective nature of the Hardman criteria, 
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as it was inescapably more distant from London than any other region 
Britain. Only 4 per cent of the jobs were recommended for Scot-in 
land (1,200 
tradeoff of 
Overseas Development for Glasgow, at the least favourable 
any recommended move), but 18 per cent for Wales and 20 
per cent for the North West. An alternative 'efficient' solution did 
not include any Scottish dispersal at all; and the Overseas Develop-
ment move was presented as something of a sop: 
'I recommend it as a solution only with serious 
misgivings and because otherwise there is no work 
from London which could go to Scotland at all. In-
deed, ministers may well feel that this is the 
right solution, given that Glasgow has done well 
out of dispersal so far •.•... if no work is to go 
to Glasgow from London, the most sensible course 
would be to consider the dispersal to Glasgow of 
parts of the Scottish Office from Edinburghr.(lO) 
With 40 per cent of the jobs recommended to stay within the South 
that his pursuit of efficiency for the civil 
regionalist orthodoxy of dispersal. 
East, Hardman recognised 
service was subverting the new 
An alternative 'regional' solution was offered to take account of 
this, at a much less favourable overall tradeoff, in which 'depart-
ments are allocated to the distant locations because, in terms of the 
measures used, they could go there with relatively less damage than 
other departments. But this does not mean that such allocations are 
anywhere near making the best locational sense for the departments 
concerned'. (ll) But even this yielded only a further 600 jobs for 
Scotland by the transfer of the Export Credit Guarantee Department. 
The Hardman report - unlike many Whitehall exercises - was con-
fident, personalised and difficult to challenge. The evidence deployed 
and the criteria implied progressed co the conclusions in a way that 
impeded the formulation of alternative proposals on different assump-
tions. Bilateral discussions between Hardman and the Departments had 
guided the definition of packages of jobs, and tradeoffs for other 
packages and rejected locations were not published. The report pro-
moted the cause of dispersal by setting up 31,000 jobs as a target; 
but in general it reinforced the initial civil service-orientated 
conception by exposing the inefficiency of regional-policy-inspired 
moves now that the core of headquarter policy functions was under 
consideration. Scottish aspirations for further dispersal jobs could 
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only be satisfied if explicit political choice asserted regional 
and justifications. 
It was fortunate for Scotland that the Hardman recommendations 
were translated into policy by the 1974 Labour Government, sensitive 
to nationalist advances, seeking a rapid between-elections policy 
announcement, and prepared to use Hardman's data while not following 
his arguments. The announcement on 30 July 1974 said of Hardman's 
recommendations that 'the Government regard such a distribution as 
unacceptable, because it undervalues the importance of the opportuni-
ties for administrative work that dispersal can provide where they 
most needed'. (l
2
) The same 31,000 jobs were to be moved, but 
cations were switched so that Scotland received 25 per cent, Wales 
even more, and the North and North West largely crowded out other 
English regions (see table 2). This was achieved chiefly by dispers-
ing about half of the Ministry of Defence's London headquarters staff,
recommended by Hardman for Milton Keynes new town in the South East, 
to the 'Glasgow area' (6,000) and Cardiff (5,000) - subject to the 
Government's defence review, a proviso later exploited by the Minis-
try. The Glasgow area was also to receive the 1,000 Overseas Develop-
ment jobs recommended by Hardman. A ten-year timescale was set for 
the move. 
In the choice of Defence for Glasgow, the Government were con-
strained by the need to move a department with 
land and capable of delivering a large contingent of jobs: in the 
Hardman package this was the only candidate. But by so crudely swit-
ching locations they were storing up trouble for the future. Now that 
the Government was giving more weight to regional criteria it might 
have been possible to return to the Hardman methodology and consider 
new packages and locations to take account of the poorer benefit-
damage tradeoff now contemplated. It is possible that new packages 
perhaps large ones involving whole departments, which on Hardman cri-
teria frequently involved less damage than smaller ones - would have 
emerged as more attractive propositions. Defence was a department 
facing contraction, now being dispersed to two sites, and losing the 
advantage of Milton Keynes as a convenient 'company town'. Glasgow's 
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the most homogeneous group of ·staff - the Procurement Executive - to 
Cardiff, the more attractive location. Glasgow was left with an un-
certain residue, the timescale slowed, and justification for the move 
had come to be based purely on Scottish considerations. 
Three tensions ran through the slow progress of Scottish 
al from 1974 to 1979. The first was that imposed by Glasgow politics. 
The jobs had been allocated to the Glasgow area, not necessarily to 
the city itself- giving a choice between an inner-city site or a 
greenfield one on the outskirts, as with the Savings Bank at Cowglen. 
Considerations of cost, timescale and practicality suggested the 
latter solution, ·but Glasgow, wishing to use the move as a vehicle 
for urban renewal, pushed for the former. The resultant discussions 
and preparation of options took a year and a half. Overseas Develop-
ment was allowed its preference of a greenfield site at Hairmyres, 
East Kilbride, for 650 of its staff, but it was announced in February 
1976 that the 5,000 Defence staff would all be housed in a massive 
office block in the centre of Glasgow at St Enoch Station, which would
be demolished to make way for it. Choosing such a difficult and expen-
sive site was bound to increase design and construction time and so 
retard the movement of the jobs. Part of the cashflow problem - and 
the fact that not all of the station site would be needed - was met 
by .having the Scottish Development Agency purchase and hold the site 
in 1977. But by mid-1977 the 1984 target completion date was in jeo-
pardy. 
Parallel difficulties in other projects, and deteriorating eco-
nomic justification as London office rents weakened, led to a general 
reappraisal of the programme, and in July 1977 both numbers and time-
scale were relaxed. The Defence contingent for Glasgow was scaled 
down and split into two parts. In order to try to meet the 1984 dead-
line, a second urban site in G~asgow - at Anderston Cross - was to be 
acquired and a block for 1,500 built. 'A f~rther group of 'up to 4,000' 
would then follow at St Enoch by the late 1980s. This announcement saw 
the divergence between the two sets of g~als and between political 
rhetoric and administrative reality widening further as a second ten-
sion - between government department~ - became clearer. 
The interests of the variou~ departments were clear and contrast-
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ing. The Scottish Office, assailed by Glasgow politicians, notably 
conservative spokesman Teddy Taylor, was bullish about the project 
and anxious to use it to promote urban renewal: it wanted to maximise 
the net gain of jobs for Scotland. The Property Services Agency, who 
were designing the buildings, wanted clear guidelines and a straight-
forward construction job and were the most sensitive to the feasibili-
ty of deadlines. The Civil Service Department, the managers of the 
dispersal programme, wanted to preserve their credibility without 
conceding too much ground to the dispersing departments who were hos-
tile to their moves. 
The Ministry of Defence's position was the most interesting and 
the most difficult. In one perspective, it was straightforwardly ob-
structionist, opposed to the move and seeking to delay it in the hope 
that the policy would collapse. But it also faced well-grounded oppos~ 
tion from staff and real difficulty in formulating its package, de-
fined in numbers rather than blocks of work. Its response was to de-
clare that it could not identify an operationally acceptable pool of 
staff to move from London to Glasgow: the groups suggested by Hard-
man for Milton Keynes (principally personnel management) were now 
too small. Instead - as emerged during 1978 - the bulk of the package 
(3,880 jobs) was to come from its staff outside London, principally 
in the form of service pay offices. The locations of these read like 
an itinerary of English country towns - Harrogate, Bath, Winchester, 
Didcot - and ironically most of them had previously been moved as 
part of the first phase of dispersal. {l
3
) When their offering-up for 
Glasgow became known to staff at these locations, their hostility 
taken up by their (Conservative) MPs - was understandable. 
This has to be regarded as a smart bureau.cratic ploy by the Min-
istry of Defence setting up a package whose absurdity would drag 
the move down with it. The difficulty in evaluating it is that the 
rules of the game within Whitehall - respected by Hardman and implicit 
in the initial goals of dispersal - leave each department as the guar-
dian of its own operational performance; a professed inability to 
meet a dispersal commitment in any other than the declared way was 
not readily open to rebuttal. The Civil Service Department might 
have performed this task, but it is a low-powered department in White-
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hall terms and on dispersal behaved cautiously in an effort to hold 
the ring. The common perception of the moves among senior civil ser-
vants was that they were politicians' ploy, to be implemented not 
necessarily disloyally but with a detachment and scepticism that 
tainted the programme. But the ability of civil servants to subvert 
the pol~cy should not be overestimated. While the Labour Government 
was in office they were to be compelled to deliver, as the outcome 
of the 1977 reappraisal showed. The execution mechanism could only 
be broken by an explicit policy reversal, for which a change of gov-
ernment offered the best opportunity. 
A third tension - that within Scotland caused by different views 
on the purpose of dispersal - was also never resolved, and contribut-
ed to the confusion and lack of realism about the programme. The tra-
ditional result of dispersal had been to deliver large slices of mo-
bile clerical jobs, which tended to be filled largely by women, many 
of whom had not previously been at work. This was less than fully 
desirable in job-creation terms. And so a new, and somewhat incom-
patible, purpose was suggested in the 1974 announcement: to bring 
higher-level jobs to Scotland and so provide career opportunities 
for civil servants. But this implied that rather more of the jobs 
would be filled initially by staff moving from London: Hardman had 
estimated about half in his package (a figure constantly quoted but 
never subsequently substantiated) 0 This both reduced the employment 
benefit to the 'indigenous• population and increased the stakes for 
staff opposition. Glasgow was slow to recognise this ambivalence; 
and it also failed to appreciate fully that the commitment of the 
Labour Government to the move was a transient political conjuncture 
on which it was imperative to capitalise by starting building work. 
The push for a city centre site - wildly inappropriate for a computer 
pay office - was an expensive diversion; 'strategic' objections to 
moving Defence jobs to a potentially self-governing Scotland were not 
recognised; and the claim of entitlement to jobs in UK departments 
was prejudiced by the failure of the Scottish Office to take any ini-
tiative on Hardman's suggestion that it move some of its own jobs 
from Edinburgh to Glasgow. 
The Scottish Office's argument against this proposition was that 
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jobs should not be moved to Glasgow by penalising other parts of Scot-
land. They were reluctant to concede the point for fear of jeopardis-
ing the total size of the jobs package from England. Intra-Scotland 
dispersal might have been a helpful gesture to the managerial problems 
of English departments, and would have been justified in itself in 
view of economic disparities within Scotland and the geographical im-
balance of civil service job opportunities. But in Whitehall politics, 
bargaining positions and a wish to preserve the consistency and cre-
dibility of arguments may be more potent than the merits of a case. 
In the case of dispersal, the responsible central department - the 
Civil Service Department - lacked the weight to impose meritorious 
arguments on the rest of Whitehall. 
Another large issue which played a part on both sides of the 
al'gument was the economic appraisal of the policy. Once again, dis-
crepant goals are evident. Hardman's approach was not a full cost-
benefit analysis for each location, for his tradeoffs used in-
commensurate units - damage in terms of civil servants' time and bene-
fits in terms of money. Hardman was dismissive of potential resource 
gains to receiving localities, suggesting that most of the jobs would 
be filled by married women not on the unemployment register and that 
most of the increased income would 'leak' to suppliers outside the 
localities. He was more concerned to isolate the costs and savings 
of the moves to the Exchequer and present the results in terms of 
annual cash flows. This showed that at the end of the ten year pro-
gramme there would be a net annual saving of £24 million (in early 
1970s prices) continuing in perpetuity; the peak net annual cost 
was £8 million in the third year of the programme. (l
4
) Such a saving 
was made possible by the then wide differential in office rents be-
tween London and the provinces (over 5:1). The savings accrued what-
ever dispersal location was chosen, since rent differences between 
possible locations were insignificant compared with the general diff-
erential with London. The penalty of more distant locations - express-
ed in the average tradeoffs - was borne by the dispersing departments 
in the form of reduced efficiency. Given Hardman's approach, he was 
more concerned with these penalties than with wider economic benefits 
to the regions. 
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Although the potential savings looked encouraging, they were in 
fact extremely vulnerable to developments in the property market and 
managerial weaknesses in the civil service. They assumed that after 
dispersal the Government could reshuffle staff in London and give up 
accommodation rented at current market levels. This was too optimistic 
Many civil service buildings in London were held on older, cheaper 
leases; regrouping of staff, vacating property and disposing of 
leases took longer than Hardman had assumed, and so the realisation 
of benefit lagged behind the incurring of cost. Moreover, the London-
provincial rent differential narrowed to something under 3:1 as the 
early 1970s property boom ended and London office control policy er-
oded; and construction costs of the new dispersal buildings increased 
especially in urban sites. The result was that, from the civil ser-
vice perspective, the cost-benefit relationship was steadily deter-
iorating and savings were being postponed into the distant future. 
By 1979, arguments based on the benefits to the civil service - the 
initial rationale for dispersal were collapsing. 
This narrow concentration on public expenditure considerations 
was frequently criticised by proponents of dispersal for devaluing the 
wider economic benefit to the receiving localities. Such criticisms 
were made in a report from Strathclyde University in mid-1979 to the 
civil service trade unions ironically most of which were by then 
opposed to dispersal because of pressure from their London members. 
This did not specifically examine the Scottish projects, but the two 
that it did evaluate - Defence to Cardiff and Property Services Agency 
to Middlesbrough - were typical large moves. The Strathclyde team used 
a much more ambitious economic model than Hardman, assessing the over-
all change in output in terms of gains to the receiving locations and 
losses to the South East. Even on updated costs a net gain to the 
economy as a whole was predicted, with an 'overall resource benefit• 
of £27-28,000 per job at present values, over half of which came from 
increased net employment rather than civil service cost savings. (l5 ) 
Do these findings demonstrate that even in 1979 dispersal was a 
sound policy, against all the assumptions of the civil service? The 
Strathclyde team, by looking more carefully at the net impact on the 
whole economy, correct the over-hasty Hardman conclusion that wider 
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resource considerations were negligible, and confirm the propriety of 
the •regional' set of goals. Reservations about their analysis are 
political rather than economic. The first is that the authors were 
able to quantify benefits to dispersing staff (such as cheaper housing 
and commuting costs) but not intangible costs (like disruption to 
social networks and childrens 1 education). Experience of earlier 
Scottish moves had revealed the salience of fears about the latter 
and, given the strength of the civil service unions, a one-sided 
economic evaluation is of little use to politicians. An attitude sur-
vey commissioned by Hardman showed that only one-fifth of staff welcom-
ed the possibility of dispersal, and that many would resign rather 
than move. (l6 ) 
Secondly, the net overall benefit projected by the study is cru-
cially dependent on the discount rate chosen (the extent to which be-
nefits arising only in the future are valued less than benefits ten-
able immediately). In public expenditure terms, where there is heavy 
short-term pressure to cut avoidable projects and other programmes 
are constantly competing for funds, benefits promised for the future 
count for far less than they should in strict economic analysis. The 
Strathclyde analysis did not promise any net benefit until 1985/86; 
and at a 10 per cent discount rate the capital cost of the Cardiff 
project (less than in Glasgow) exceeds rent savings, and the overall 
resource benefit is reduced by over 70 per cent, when compared with 
the 5 per cent discount rate preferred by the authors. (l
7
) It was 
impossible - especially in the late 1970s - to expect long-term 
whole-economy effects to serve as an effective political counter to 
direct short-term budgetary demands. 
All these tensions and political and economic considerations 
contributed to the fate of the dispersal programme under the incoming 
1979 Conservative Government, which immediately halted dispersal pen-
ding review. Their conclusions, announced on 26 July 1979, were re-
ceived with predictable dismay by many in Scotland; but, in a some-
what unexpected twist, the Scottish pork-barrel case proved remarkably 
potent, even after the election defeat of Teddy Taylor, the chief 
Conservative promoter of dispersal. The principle implicit in the 
review was that moves which had started should proceed while those 
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still at the planning stage should be halted. {l8 ) This was rough just-
ice, but provided a test of whether any region could mobilise enough 
influence in the Cabinet to modify the principle. The only one that 
could was Scotland, which held on to 'at least 2,000' Defence and 
Overseas Development jobs at Hairmyres and St Enoch; the Anderston 
building project was abandoned. This was much less than the original 
7,000, but the equivalent Defence move to Cardiff, a more homogeneous 
package at a more advanced stage of planning, was cancelled. In one 
perspective, Scotland did relatively better than in any previous dis-
persal package, with 30 per cent of the 6,000-odd jobs (see Table 1). 
It must be said that delivery of the jobs is not yet guaranteed: al-
though the Defence jobs, all coming from London,were identified in 
early 1980, further staff resistance may be expected. But in the dy-
namics of the Conservative cabinet the outcome has to be regarded as 
a victory for Scotland and an assertion of the residual political re-
sonance of the regionalist goal of dispersal policy, which could 
be deployed by Scotland, though not by other peripheral regions. 
The various dispersal programmes have not transformed the loca-
tional profile of the civil service, but the regional impact has been 
uneven and some regions have done very much better than others. Scot-
land has received 12 per cent of the jobs, no more than 
on a population basis, and it now has almost exactly the same share 
of the UK civil service as of the UK population. But, as Table 2 
shows, two regions have done better: Wales especially, where the 
leverage described by Crossman and endorsed by Hardman has had a 
major effect - nearly a quarter of all civil service jobs in Wales 
are dispersed or newly created. The North of England has also done 
well, and as a result it, unlike most English regions, has its fair 
share of civil service jobs. But the other English regions have all 
done less well than Scotland, and Northern Ireland has been excluded 
from the whole exercise, although it is covered by some UK departments. 
One important shortcoming in the programme has emerged: the 
tendency for large clerical operations to fall short of their promised 
employment levels. The Post Office Savings Bank in Glasgow had an 
original target of 7,500 jobs, but less than 4,500 have materialised; 
a similar effect has occurred at the Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
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centre at Swansea. These clerical factories are vulnerable to tech-
nological developments which reduce their labour requirement and to 
policy changes that contract their tasks: as peripheral parts of 
their departments, both geographically and organisationally, they are 
prime candidates for manpower cuts, and the Savings Bank will suffer 
from the 1,000 jobs to be lost in the Department of National Savings 
as part of the civil service staff cuts announced in December 1979. 
In this respect, Scottish fears about the concentration of low-grade 
jobs without policy content have proved justified. The location of 
the UK cabinet and Parliament in London remains a fundamental con-
straint on dispersal policy which most of the debate has evaded. 
Surveyed as a whole, dispersal is a somewhat unfortunate story 
of changes of policy, bureaucratic prevarication and inadequate policy 
analysis. Underlying it has been a weakness in policy formulation ex-
pressed by discrepant goals - a lack of certainty about who the policy 
was designed to benefit and how, the resource shifts involved, and 
how the relation between gainers and losers ought to be calibrated. 
The goals of minimal disruption to the civil service and maximum be-
nefit to the receiving locations were imperceptibly allowed to merge. 
The most careful analytical exercise - the Hardman report - was 
grounded firmly on the former goal, but when its recommendations were 
attached to the latter goal in 1974 no alternative quantitative ra-
tionale was substituted. The new allocations were liable to subversion 
from a civil service still attached to the previous goal, and there 
was no mechanism for evaluating whether the deteriorating economics of 
the moves had passed into unacceptability. Above all, the crisis-
management orientation of public expenditure control in the 1970s 
devalued long-range benefits in comparison with all-too-perceptible 
short-run costs which in this case were discretionary and avoidable. 
In this perspective, it is remarkable that dispersal to Scotland 
has been as extensive as it has,for it represents the triumph of 
pork-barrel politics at cabinet level over the inclinations and in-
terests of the civil service and perhaps over the weight of the argu-
ment. It is a reminder that explicit political direction can lead to 
policy implementation, however distastefully, and that bureaucratic 
interests tend to be fragmented rather than monolithic. It is also a 
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tribute to the political weight of Scotland in the UK in the 1960s 
and 1970s and the sensitivity of both main parties to their fortunes 
there - the 1974 Labour Government especially, but to a surprising 
extent the present and previous Conservative administrations also. 
Dispersal was an inviting policy because it allowed the presentation 
of political payoffs with full political fanfare and was a visible 
proof of the value of the UK connection to Scotland; as an indicator
of political weight, it was a policy that politicians loved to fight 
over. But to secure a policy, ad hoc debate at a high level needs to 
be sustained by a consistent structure of goals; otherwise, its im-
plementation will be fitful and its long-term future uncertain. This 
is what happened to civil service dispersal and is why, despite the 
achievements of the policy, few can now regard it with full satisfac-
tion. 
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